Wednesday, August 29, 2007

The Battle of FOB Raider

Our last major training event at Fort McCoy was a Base Defense exercise. This involved the manning – and defending – of a mythical Forward Operating Base, or FOB.

Our Navy unit, as I said before, is fairly small, so in order to do this event, we had to team up with an Air Force unit which was also going through training at the same time. We started out on Day 1 doing actual FOB work at FOB Freedom – learning to guard the gates, do vehicle inspections and personnel inspections.

Day Two, however, would be more complex. We would move out to FOB Raider – a live-fire range where we would be tested as never before.

Because it was a live-fire range, this FOB was one-dimensional, with all the towers on one side aligned on the range, to ensure that all the live ammunition went in one – safe – direction. On the back side, there was a gate with a guard tower. Iraqi actors would come through this gate on foot or in cars throughout the exercise.

On the range in front of the towers was another movie-set like city of wooden building fronts. Also arrayed there were cutouts of Iraqi civilians, mosques, chickens and goats. Among these were a series of the now familiar pop-up targets. But before one could shoot, one had to be careful.

The whole purpose of the exercise – beyond defending the base – was to identify targets clearly before you shot.

No country in the history of warfare has done more than America to reduce the amount of suffering among innocent civilians. But that doesn’t mean it’s always easy to distinguish between friend and foe on the urban battlefield. So quick recognition of insurgents, civilians, Iraqi police, etc. is vital to winning the war and restoring the peace in Iraq.

So although it would be a game, in a sense, our orders at FOB Raider were very serious – do not shoot the wrong targets. Anyone who did would be subject to an investigation. If the shooting was intentional, there would be real-world consequences.

There are a dozen tasks to be done at a FOB. Tower guards, gate guards, entry control point, vehicle inspections, personnel inspections, casualty-collection point/litter bearers, Quick Reaction Force (QRF), radio control and more.

All of these posts had to be filled, and more importantly, they had to be rotated. The exercise would not end until a certain percentage of the unit members had participated in the live fire from the towers or the QRF.

The job of organizing and running the whole FOB operations was centered on the Tactical Operations Center (TOC). There would be an overall commander in charge and an assistant commander who would do the actual work of assigning people to various positions. In our unit commanders’ briefing the day before the exercise, we were told that 45 percent of the work for the entire exercise would be done by the latter person.

And they were right, as I would find out.

Because we were a mixed Navy/Air Force unit, we had to come to an agreement with our sister service on how best to manage the situation. There were 18 Navy and 34 Air Force, so the numbers didn’t give us much clout. The highest ranking Navy officer (myself) was an 0-2 (LTJG) and the Air Force had Two Lt. Colonels, (0-5) a couple of Majors (0-4) and a Captain or two (0-3). So I was clearly outranked, as well as outmanned. It was clear that the overall commander would be an Air Force officer, and the best I could hope for – and what I got – was the assistant’s job.

There, in charge of the board in which I could move people around like a puppeteer, I could at least ensure that my Navy folks were getting the training – and also the rest – that they needed. An Air Force officer was then appointed as my assistant – with the idea that he could take over once I went out to a tower to get some shooting time of my own.

As the exercise began, the base came under sniper fire, and our guys in the towers shot back at insurgents, waiting patiently through dozens of pop-ups of civilians until an insurgent popped up. When they did, our gunners would shoot them down.

The guidelines we had meant rotating each of the seven towers once every two hours. This is a complex task, as only the Sergent of the Guard (SOG) could do this – escorting the replacements to the towers, and swapping them out – all the while ensuring that no live rounds were left in the weapons once the shooters came down from the towers. This was crucial for safety within the FOB.
My plan was to rotate the tower guards first with the Entry Control Point (ECP) people, and then move on to other low-priority jobs.

But nothing ever works that smoothly.

After the first rotation was up, the sporadic fire on our base had been increased. There were now mortars running down. Suddenly, we got a call over the radio:
“Mortars have hit Tower One. We have one casualty, over.”

From there on, it developed into one of the most intense periods of my life. For five straight hours, I was at the center of a massive beehive of activity, trying to bring order out of a firestorm of chaos.

I quickly sent a man from the ECP to Tower One. The injured person was brought to the Casualty Collection Point. On my magnetic white board, I maneuvered two magnetic strips with names on them across the board to reflect the change. So far, so good.

Now it was time to rotate the towers. I started with Tower Seven and began to work back to Tower One.

But before I could act, a mortar hit the ECP, and my ECP commander was out. I quickly appointed a new commander and cancelled my planned move to Tower Seven, since that would leave the ECP down four men – two for Tower Seven, the one I had moved to Tower 1, and the one killed by the mortar. I decided to take them from one of our two litter bearer teams at the CCP instead.

And so it went, on and on. The smooth transition plan by which I would relieve one tower every 15 minutes fell apart completely as the action picked up. As the casualties were “evacuated” by helicopter or pronounced dead, they would regenerate 15 minutes later. But it was never enough, and I was always short-handed. I had originally planned to split time with an Air Force 1st Lt. when I needed a break, but after the first casualties, I had to assign him to a tower and I never got him back. Later on in the day, I brought in a chief from our Navy team to learn my job, but before 15 minutes was out, I needed to replace someone and he was the only one available.

In a real battle, you could close off the main gate, but not here. The instructors ruled that out entirely. So everything proceeded surreally as it would in quiet times, as mortar fire came through. We got word over the radio that the “mayor” of the local Iraqi village was here to meet with us. The Air Force Lt. Col. turned his duties over to me and went outside to hear what he had to say.

“Tower Five has been hit!”

I had just sent a crew to replace Tower Four. It was getting very close to the two-hour mandatory rotation time, and I still had three towers to replace: Four, Two and one man in One (the second being the man who came in an hour into the battle).

One man and one woman (both Air Force people) in Tower Five were now dead, and the tower was completely empty, exposing the base significantly. I had to act quickly.

“Fox 5 to Fox 3” I called over my walkie-talkie to the SOG, who was taking the crew to Tower 4.

“Fox 3 over.”

“Redirect crew en route to Tower Four to Tower Five, over.”

“Fox 3, roger.”

But then that screwed up my relief of Tower Four. Being the central tower, it was the only one that communicated directly with our main radio operators, and served as a relay point for all communication going to all towers. One requirement was that one of the people in the tower be skilled with a radio. I had sent an Air Force guy with those qualifications over to relieve it, but now he was in Tower Five instead.

I turned to the radio operator. (My walkie talkie connected me with only the two SOGs and my runner).

“Get a hold of the ECP. Tell them to release so-and-so and have him report to Tower Four.”
I then took a look at my casualty list. Each name had a time marked on the white board beside it. I checked my watch.

“Fox 5 to Fox 2,” I said into the walkie talkie, calling my runner.

“Fox 2 over.”

“Where are you, Fox 2.”

“Returning from delivering ammunition. Near Tower Six.”

“Get over to the CCP. They have two dead people about to ripen. As soon as they’re back alive, get one of them over to Tower 4 pronto.”

It continued like this all day long. Standing in the TOC, I at least had the benefit of air conditioning, though I still had to wear my body armor. My helmet I could do without, until I heard a mortar round coming near, in which case, everyone in our building grabbed our helmets and took cover on the floor. After ten seconds, we got up and resumed our work.

The situation was growing increasingly more difficult, but between myself, the SOGs and the runner, I had figured out a fairly efficient system, and the action seemed to mellow a little around noon. I opened up my MRE and took a few bites of my Chicken Cavatelli. I never got to finish it, but I did eat all the snacks, including the Vanilla Pound Cake, which was very good.

It was at this lull that I assessed my board. The goal was to get 100 percent (80 percent was acceptable) of our people out as shooters. I had marked with green ink all of those who had done so. The rotation was working, however there was one place we weren’t getting shooters from: right here in the TOC. I decided to see if we could get any time for these people, especially the Air Force Lt. Col.

“Sir, would you like to go to a tower?”

“Yes, if it’s possible.”

“Who would you like to replace you?” Thinking of all the Air Force officers above my pay grade, I made a few suggestions.

“I don’t care,” he said. “You’re doing all the work here anyway.”

It was perhaps an overstatement, but it was a good compliment, so I took it. In the end, I swapped out one of our two radio operators and my runner. Time, and a deteriorating situation made any more impossible.

We had all started the day with plenty of ammunition, but around this time, it became a concern. I got a call that a tower was “amber” (yellow) on ammo. Not having any stores available at that instant, I did the only thing I could. I took the ammo from myself and everybody in the TOC and handed it to the runner. He took it out to the tower.

“Get a call into the BDOC and request more ammo,” I said, referring to the overall FOB command (essentially the instructors), as we had been told to do.

It took some time, but finally the ammo came. From now on, in all the spare seconds I had away from my board, I, along with anybody else who was able, was speed-loading M-16 magazines with ammo.

1300 Hours. Time for the second rotation. Actually, with some towers hit, and others rotated in a staggered cycle, I was always rotating. But more and more casualties made it more and more difficult. I was even having to pull people from the QRF.

The Quick Reaction Force (QRF) actually drove out onto the range in Humvees in simulated action against small targets in the town. To do this safely, three towers shut down when the QRF left, and the other four towers shifted their fire. The QRF folks were all getting their own shooting time, and needed to be an organized team. For this reason, we gave the entire QRF to the Air Force. But necessity forced me to pull from this team.

One big concern was a lack of Combat Life Savers in our medical tent. As they were doing real live IV sticks in the tent, one or two was not enough. We needed four, five, or even six. I began to cycle our CLS personnel (marked on their tags with a red cross) into the CCP. I sent one Air Force 1st Lt. there to help out and she basically took over the show and ran it. Very effectively from all the reports. Suddenly, the CCP was able to operate faster, and that gave me the ability to pull one or two more people from their teams.

Ammo was running down again. At 1311, I put in a call for more ammo. Fifteen minutes passed and the best I had got is that they would try to get us some. Then another 15. I called back. Another 15.

The ammunition supply was now getting critical, and I called for conservation. I then stripped all the ammo from the TOC and from the soldiers on the CCP. The ECP I stripped also, since their job of searching visitors and vehicles did not require the use of live rounds (which would have been impossible to do safely).

“Tower One black on ammo.”

That was not a good sign.

“Fox 2 this is Fox Five. I need Ammo taken to Tower One.”

The ammo arrived. But scarcely had the catastrophe been averted than another tower popped up. And another. It was like ammunition “whack-a-mole.”

The door to the trailer opened. One of my two SOGs came in. “SOG” I was discovering, was appropriate, since it accurately described the soaked state of their uniforms. They were literally running across the base in full body armor. One of them was in his 20s. The other in his 50s. The latter one had come through the door and I told him to sit down a while.

“Tower Seven has 10 magazines.”

“What? Have they been hoarding them?”

“They have so many because every time the QRF goes out of the gate, they have to stop firing.”
It was obvious, but I had missed it. I called to the other SOG and to my runner. Towers Five, Six and Seven would all logically have more ammo than the others. I told them to collect all but three mags and spread them out among the other towers.

That alone bought us another 15 minutes, but there was still no word on the ammo. I began to get a sinking feeling, and remembered the beginning scene in “Star Trek II” where the crew of the Enterprise faced a training scenario that was a true no-win situation. The BDOC was starving us of ammo, which means the training day was coming to an end.

But I didn’t want to end on a losing note, so I called for my guys to conserve ammo and pick their targets carefully. As time went on, they nonetheless started calling in:

“Tower One, black on ammo.”

“Tower Four, black on ammo.”

“Tower Three, black on ammo.”

I turned to one of the Army instructors, who had a mischievous grin on his face. “Can I tell them to fix bayonets?” I asked. He laughed.

By 1420 it was over. Word came over the radio from the BDOC, and the shooting stopped.
I stepped out of the trailer and into the bright sunlight and heat. Slowly the troops were making it back up the hill to the room where we would break the exercise down in an After Action Report.

It had been the most intense five hours of my life, and I was emotionally drained. I had been on my feet constantly, moving constantly, but never left a space bigger than six feet by fifteen.

I had acquitted myself well – all the Army instructors said as much. And our Navy and Air Force Teams, who had been rivals for a month, had somehow coalesced into something effective. Sitting down with them, I looked at their nametags and – at least for the Air Force guys – put faces with the names that I had been moving around the board all day like mere numbers.

The Battle Commander’s position is one of the hardest in the military, but it seemed very simple to me. There were no right or wrong decisions, there was only decision and indecision. You had to make the call, and deal with it, however it worked out. There was no time to second-guess and no time to evaluate. Action did not guarantee success. Inaction, however, guaranteed failure.

It was the end of my training at Fort McCoy. Two days later, I flew out of Wisconsin. Tomorrow, I take another flight, this time to Kuwait. I may never use some of the training that I got at Fort McCoy, but I’ll never forget it. In the back of my mind, however, I know that if the worst ever happens, I’ve had the best preparation I could possibly get short of real battlefield experience.
Here’s hoping that’s all the experience I have.

Sunday, August 26, 2007

Humvee Gunner





Everything in Iraq moves by convoys. Fuel, food, soldiers and yes, sailors too.


Of course, there are different kinds of convoys. Some are active patrols sent “outside the wire” to go find and engage the enemy. Others escort humanitarian supplies or Iraqi leaders threatened by the insurgency.

There are no mere passengers in a U.S. military convoy. Every person traveling in one is an active participant of a complex machine designed to evade terrorist threats, defend itself in case of attack, and fulfill a mission.


To that end, every soldier, sailor, airman and Marine who steps on ground in country needs to know the basics of convoy operations, how to defend and recover a damaged vehicle, and how to get out of a “kill zone” alive. This past week, our unit got the crash course. And I do mean “crash.” One of our Humvees came back with a little side panel damage, but no one was injured.
It started, as all such courses do, in the classroom. In this case, it was a return trip to our home away from home, FOB Freedom, for a lovely day-long class in a double-wide trailer. With our guns stowed below our chairs and our body armor in cubbies in the back room, we sat down for our lesson.

Once again, we watched a lot of videos. The video camera in Iraq, 2007, has become what the scalping knife was during the French and Indian War. Our enemy likes to film every attack on Americans, because that’s the proof that they use to show their paymasters that they did their job. No video, no money. Consequently, there are very few video tourists in Iraq. Anyone pulling out a video camera near American troops stands a very good chance of winding up on the wrong end of a U.S. Army sniper team.

I won’t go into our tactics, of course. Even though they’re not really secret, the less they are broadcast, the better. Either way, we’re constantly evolving to meet the greatest threats.
Among those threats are IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices), which can range from homemade bombs to highly-sophisticated devices which may or may not have lots of parts manufactured in a certain country to the East of Iraq.


These are often triggered by an old-fashioned wire system, or by a passive infra-red system that detects movement (like the doors at the supermarket that open for you automatically), or through short-distance radio signals (garage door openers) and cell phones. IEDs can be hidden in roadside trash – all of Iraq is basically one big trash dump – in junk cars, in moving cars, on people and dead animals.

The most common one is a 155 mm artillery shell – a relatively common thing in a country smaller than Texas which 18 years ago boasted the Fourth largest army in the world after the U.S., Soviet Union and China.

Another threat – and a growing one – is Explosively-Formed Projectiles, or EFPs. These are very sophisticated devices, which uses an explosion behind a mass (usually copper), which is then instantaneously melted, shot through the air in a semi-liquid state, and hardens as it impacts the vehicle. I’ll leave it to the reader to decide whether or not a few illiterate Iraqi deadbeats – which most of the insurgents are – can build these in their garage entirely by themselves, or if they may also be looking east for assistance.

Depending on how big these devices are, how they’re placed, etc. they can blow up our biggest tanks or a group of Humvees can shoot right past them, blowing them off right and left without slowing down. When the big ones are spotted, we have remote-controlled robots we can send up to defuse them, but any time you’re stopped out on the road, you have to watch for an ambush.

After the day of classroom training was over, we moved out to the motor pool and checked out our Humvees. Our little group of sailors only warranted four of the vehicles, which made us one of the smallest convoys in the history of Fort McCoy. It reminded me of the Far Side cartoon called, “A Young Ghengis Khan and his Mongol Hordette” (with a photo of five or six Mongols on tiny ponies).

Of course, we could have hooked up with the Air Force engineering group, which has shadowed our movements from day One. But the Air Force didn’t want us, and frankly, we didn’t want them either. Having two separate command structures for one convoy would make coordination impossible. So they went out in their convoy of seven, and we went out in our convoy of three, one after another, on the same route.

As we reached our vehicles and climbed around, we began to assign people to vehicles. The drivers were pretty much set. Only five of our sailors had been through the required Army Humvee drivers’ course (which they took while I took the Combat Life Saver course and others took classes like advanced hand-to-hand combat).

Again, I took the opportunity to assign jobs to my subordinates to get them to practice their leadership abilities. With the input of our Chiefs, I chose Petty Officer Rogers – who is from my same reserve unit back in San Antonio – to be the Convoy Commander. We chose other Petty Officers to serve as Truck Commanders for the various trucks.

Climbing up into the turret of one of the Humvees, I made some comments about how fun it would be to be a turret gunner, and though I was only making that comment in passing, being the superior officer, it was interpreted as a command, and henceforth, I was to be a Humvee gunner. Only after I climbed out of the vehicle, which was already lined up in the formation, did I realize I was also on the lead truck.


(Photo: Me atop my Humvee)

The lead truck in any convoy is the most exposed vehicle, because it usually trips all the automatic IEDs. And the gunner, sticking out on top in a protected, but open (on the top) turret is the most exposed person in that vehicle.

In the entire U.S. military vocabulary, the most courageous statement a man can make is “I’ve got point” – the lead, most exposed position. That’s what the lead Humvee Gunner essentially is.
Of course, this was just an exercise, and the only real danger – until the live fire exercise – was a rollover, since the gunner has no seatbelt. In that case, he has to fall back into the vehicle and try to grab something before the vehicle – which is very top-heavy – goes over. In all the drills, I never once found a position in which I felt I would be able to survive a roll-over. The best I figured was to jam my feet below the radio, grab the back-seat passenger’s seat belt with my hands and pray.

Fortunately, it never came to that. I was blessed to have the best driver in our convoy, Petty Officer Killian, who is also from my reserve unit, and in his regular job works for the Austin Police Department. Unlike two of our drivers, who had a minor fender-bender, he executed all of his movements flawlessly.

Also in my vehicle were both of our females, Petty Officer Moore (our Truck Commander) and Petty Officer McGuire. Although Humvee gunners usually have crew-served weapons – 50 caliber machine guns or 240 Bravos, our unit doesn’t have any, so we just went with our M-16s. For training purposes, it worked.

Lined up behind our vehicle on a rainy morning the next day, our mini-convoy moved out. Following an Instructor’s Humvee, we drove out to the course. As we had been told, this was a “Crawl, Walk Run” exercise, and Day Two was crawl.


The course was a short one: a straight run through a movie-set-like village. As lead gunner, I was the one person in our convoy who would see the most action.

In reality, the scenarios weren’t much of a surprise, because we were behind the Air Force, and as we sat there waiting our turn, we could hear some of what went on ahead, and see a little as well.

The first run was simple. We drove right through with no incident. The people waved at us with friendly waves, and despite one or two folks walking around with weapons – common in Iraq – none raised them at us, and none of our guys fired.

The next run, we got a different reception. Although most of the “villagers” were friendly, a man jumped out from behind our village and pointed his rifle directly at me.

Now, I’ve been firing guns since I was six or seven years old. I’ve shot thousands of rounds of ammunition, and seen others shoot as well. But never in my life had I had the experience of someone aiming a weapon directly at me and pulling the trigger. The muzzle flash of a rifle – which I’d seen so many times before – suddenly looks different from head-on.

Of course, the impromptu insurgent was firing blanks, and at almost the identical moment, I was lined up on him, firing a burst of blank rounds from my M-16. Despite the novelty, nothing about it really felt all that weird. I aimed my weapon at another human being and pulled the trigger. As we passed by, I thought about that, and how incredibly easy it was to do. Blanks are blanks, but I had gone against lessons my daddy had taught me since I could crawl, and I expected a bit more hesitation. The ease of it left me slightly uncomfortable, but I would soon get used to it.

The next time, we came into the same little village and this time there were dozens of “protesters” formed up in a line across the road, with tires and tree branches spread out in front of our path. I followed our escalation of force guidelines, also known as the Five S’s:

Shout (Tell them to move away: “Imshee. Imshee”)

Show (Show your weapon, look mean and let them know you’re ready. At the same time, the driver guns the engine.


Shove (This works better on the ground, but the driver can move forward slightly and have the same effect.)

Shoot to warn (A shot into the air)

Shoot to kill

Fortunately, in this situation, I reached Step 4 and as soon as I fired my shot, the protesters dispersed.

The next scenario of note involved an IED strike on one of our vehicles. We had to form into a position that screened the injured vehicle from attack, have one person jump out (behind the protection of the screening vehicle) and attach a tow rope to the damaged vehicle. We then got out of there as fast as we could.

It’s a complex operation, and it took a long time the first go-round. But as the next couple of days went by, we got increasingly faster.


Day Three (the second day of actual exercises) was the “walk” phase of our convoy operations training. This time, we went out on a very long course, ranging over several miles, with various scenarios and two villages (which we went through twice each).


We started out with an escort mission. Our VIP was an Iraqi politician (one of our many great, awesome and friendly Iraqi Americans who do this stuff full-time). With his van in the middle of our convoy, we proceeded down the route.

Entering the outskirts of one village that our intelligence report said was mostly friendly, I spied something in the middle of the road. Instantly, I called down to the driver “Possible IED, 12:00.”
Killian stopped quickly, and I turned my turret off-center to provide protection against any blast. We were a good distance away – 200 meters – though we needed a little more space, and I guided Killian in backing up, which we could only do after vehicles Four, Three, Iraqi and Two had done so.

Our truck commander verified the IED – an artillery shell – and we called in the Explosive Ordnance Detail to defuse it.

Our instructors then told us that defusing the device would take a while and routed us off the main road through the village.

We entered cautiously, though as expected, the village was very friendly. But there were rumors that the insurgents were trying to pry the village from its friendly atmosphere by attacking Americans and trying to trap us into using excessive force.

Sure enough, after we had passed through the “buildings” (mostly stacked freight cars), we got attacked on the outside of the village.

I shot a lot of rounds, but probably shouldn’t have, since I couldn’t actually make out the targets. Fortunately, there were no civilians in the area to hit.

A few seconds later, our truck was hit by an IED (an instructor threw a flash-bang grenade by our tire and then, after we stopped, threw out a smoke grenade). There were no casualties, but I had to keep covering my sector of fire as the other vehicles came up and pulled us out.

After a few more scenarios, we arrived at the destination, dropped off our Iraqi and ate MREs for lunch while the instructors went over what we did right and wrong.

We did more of the same the rest of the day. The highlight for me was when our truck was again struck by an IED (the instructors always had to blow “invisible” IEDs, because myself and our truck commander saw every single planted one in the scenario).

After our truck stopped, an instructor came out, and handed me up a laminated card showing my “injury” – an amputated right hand.

I fell down into the vehicle and then proceeded to put my own tourniquet on with my left hand – just like I learned in my Combat Life Saver class.

After towing our truck out of the “kill zone” to a safe area, I was pulled from the vehicle and placed on the ground. I screamed a little to make it more fun, but after one of my buddies pulled out the needle for a field IV, I decided I would rather have my fellow sailors calm and relaxed for a few minutes.

The first stick didn’t work, so he switched arms. I decided that for the sake of this exercise, I’d only have my hand amputated, and slid down my tourniquet to give him more room. This time he stuck me well, and though it left a bruise that’s still there four days later, it worked.
After I had been treated, the “helicopter” arrived. We had called it from the command truck, and the instructors reported departure, 20 minutes out and 5 minutes out. As the instructor who simulated the helicopter walked up, one of our sailors waved him in using the signals we had pre-arranged, along with a canister of purple smoke, which gave him the site – and the wind direction.

We use smoke a lot, but the colors vary. We never tell the helicopter what the color will be, because the insurgents listen to the radio too, could have captured smoke, and they’d love to get their hands on an American helicopter through deception. So the smoke – and other things – are designed to vector the helicopter to one and only one spot.

So I was hauled out to the invisible helicopter on a stretcher, and then released by the instructors. After dusting myself off, resetting my body armor and retrieving my gun, I was back in business.

On our way back through the village we’d been through before, we were supposed to have a meeting with the local Iraqi Police Chief. So we parked, let some of our guys out, and for 20-30 minutes, we were left idling in the middle of the village.

Our back-seaters got out and provided additional security, keeping the villagers away from our vehicles while we gunners continuously rotated our turrets and scanned for possible insurgents. There were curious women walking back and forth, some offering us food – which we couldn’t take – and some sketchy-looking men in long “man-dresses” as we call them, who could easily be hiding a bomb, a weapon, or nothing at all.

We got out of there without any incident, although some of our guys fired warning shots. At the edge of the village, we did get a sniper, but we shot back right at him without “hitting” anything else.

Day Four was the real thing – with real live ammunition.
This, as a leader of a unit, was the most stressful thing of our training. We would have people exiting our vehicle and on the ground during a live-fire exercise. It turned out well, because we were never “attacked” until our people were in safe positions behind the truck, but it still scared me.

In one exercise, we were attacked by insurgents (pop-up dummies) while we stood there waiting for an IED to be defused. I shot them down by the dozens from the turret, while my crewmembers shot across the hood or from behind the vehicle.

When the bomb was gone, the “attacks” died down and our instructors gave us the go-ahead to move out. We mounted back up and drove through another movie-set village, this one with cardboard cutouts, not real actors. The insurgents were either placed up beside them, wearing plywood rifles or popping up as targets, holding Kalishnikovs and RPGs. I shot as best I could, but found it difficult to hit a target while the driver accelerated, slammed on the breaks, or took a turn.

As chaotic as it sounds, it was all very safe. I was restricted most times to only a 30 degree angle to the sides, and all of the targets were on one side of what was effectively a massive, 150-200 acre shooting range.

On our very last run, we got a “casualty” and as we headed back to FOB Freedom, we did something that impressed our instructors. In Vehicle 2 behind me, one of our team’s Combat Life Savers performed a live IV stick while moving – across railroad tracks.
Finally, we returned back to the FOB, and pulled in back safe behind the berm and razor-wire defenses.

Ultimately, our guys may rarely use these skills. Most likely, we’ll be back-seat passengers with limited duties, while the real experts do the bulk of the work. I damn sure hope I’m never a gunner – certainly I never will by design, but I hope not by circumstance either. And I really hope I’m never the lead gunner. IEDs are the number one cause of American deaths in Iraq, and the lead vehicle is hit in the majority of cases.

But there’s always the possibility, as the case of Jessica Lynch and her transportation unit – hardly a combat unit – clearly shows. Although none of our sailors feels like an expert on convoy operations, we all have a clear idea of the tasks assigned, and if called upon, I think we will acquit ourselves well. We’re all a bunch of sailors going to Iraq to help out the army with our special skills, not fight their fight for them.

But you never know what will happen in a country where every road is a battlefield and every village can either be a haven of pro-American Iraqis, a death trap – or even both at the same time. So we prepare for everything, because in Iraq, anything can happen.

James

P.S. By the way, the Fort McCoy newspaper did a story on our unit. Here is the link:

http://www.mccoy.army.mil/ReadingRoom/Triad/current/Navy_Learns_Army_Ways.htm